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BOOK REVIEWS
Michael Heidelberger and Gregor Schiemann, eds. The Significance of the Hypothet-
ical in the Natural Sciences. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009. Pp. viii+376. $109.00 (cloth).
The Significance of the Hypothetical in the Natural Sciences brings together a
brief editorial introduction and 14 essays by authors who will be very well
known to HOPOS readers. Most of the articles come from a 2005 conference
at the University of Tübingen, and although four of the articles have been
previously printed, only one appeared previously in English. The essays in
the book fall squarely into the category of HOPOS scholarship, given the his-
torical treatment that philosophers of science and philosophically minded
scientists receive. Indeed, the general topic of the book is the genesis and in-
terpretation of a philosophical idea, the hypothetical in the natural sciences.
In part, this means the rise of the hypothetical-deductive method and abduc-
tion, rather than induction as the primary methodology of the sciences, but it
also refers to fallibilism and to the provisional nature of scientific claims.
The central theme of the book is the change from an axiomatic to a hy-
pothetical perspective, and Helmut Pulte and Ernan McMullin’s chapters ad-
dress this very directly, the latter coming close to defining modern science as
that which has a self-conception as hypothetical. In any case, the conception
of the sort of knowledge that can be gained through science changed dramat-
ically in the early modern period, as McMullin documents, considering the
views of Copernicus, Kepler, Bacon, Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and Newton.
Pulte analyzes the rise of hypothetical thinking by studying Carl Neumann’s
nineteenth-century analysis of the foundations of Newtonian Mechanics,
finding that the development of pure mathematics was key to the shift to
the hypothetical conception. Laura Synder shows that in nineteenth-century
Britain the inductive and hypothetical-deductive methods were much closer
together than might be expected. While focusing on Herschel, she shows how
both he and Whewell put constraints on the discovery of hypotheses. Far
from Popper’s bold conjectures, these hypotheses are informed by induction,
so Whewell could claim to be the progeny of Bacon.
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It comes as no surprise, given the title of his major work on the philosophy
of science—Science and Hypothesis—that Henri Poincaré’s views make up a
significant portion of the discussion in the book. The role of hypotheses and
conventions in Poincaré’s philosophy is studied by Gerhard Heinzmann
and Scott Walter. Heinzmann analyzes Poincaré’s classification of hypotheses
and links his geometric conventionalism to hypothetical reasoning. In analyz-
ing Poincaré’s reasons for maintaining Galilei spacetime (and for his infamous
prediction that Euclidean geometry will continue to be used in physics
no matter what), Walter shows that Poincaré took the principle of relativity
to be a convention, while Einstein and others did not. Christophe Bouriau
rounds out this set of articles with a comparison betweenVaihinger and Poincaré,
finding that they both see science as hypothetical and can be usefully described
as presenting a form of pragmatism, although they differ from William James
and F. C. S. Schiller on truth and hence present a novel form of pragmatism.
Of course, Peirce also vehemently rejected this theory of truth, so even within
classic pragmatism there is considerable room for differing opinions.
The collection also contains many studies of individual philosophers or
scientists on the issue of hypotheticity, several of which connect the issue to
the realism versus empiricism (scientific antirealism) debate. Taking the studies
of philosophers first, Andreas Bartels looks at the views of Duhem and Popper,
noting that although they were on opposite sides of the realism debate, they
both, but for different reasons, linked hypotheticity and antirealism, something
that is no longer done in contemporary discussions of realism. The reason
seems to be that the contemporary debate over realism centers around the
narrow issue of the belief in the existence of unobservables, rather than a more
general issue of the limits of human knowledge and the hypothetical character
of science. Alfred Nordmann compares the views of Peirce and Popper, noting
that while Peirce did not associate hypotheticity with fallibilism, Popper did.
Popper is committed to a realism that accepts the skeptical challenge that
we can never have access to the real world. Peirce, of course, dismisses such
skepticism as misguided and meaningless. Nordmann ends by nicely connect-
ing Peirce to philosophers who emphasize experimental practice, what he calls
technoscience, whereas Popper analyzes science at the level of theory and thus
misses the importance of experimental practice. In a chapter originally written
for a different purpose, Gad Freudenthal studies instrumentalism and realism
in the history of astronomy, pitting Duhem against Popper and Maimonides
against Gersonides in these debates. He shows that the philosophers generalized
the stances that they took in regard to scientific realism, while the historical
actors in astronomy had a specific science in mind. He links his chapter to
the topic of hypotheses in an afterword, in which he argues that the negotiated
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clash of two sciences, mathematical astronomy and Aristotelian physics, gave
rise to the notion that scientific claims are to be first accepted hypothetically in
order to be examined later. Rainer Specht studies Locke’s empiricism, finding
that the gulf between rationalism and empiricism is not very wide in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. He considers the views of many impor-
tant players in the rise of empiricism besides Locke, such as Gassendi and
Boyle, painting a very nuanced picture of Locke and his influence, especially
in Germany. Turning away from the realism debate but remaining with the
studies of philosophers, Michael Heidelberger looks at Emile Boutroux’s
concept of contingency, finding another link to pragmatism—this time Peirce’s
Tychism—and also parallels with Nancy Cartwright’s early work on laws of
nature. He also finds a hypothetical, anti-Kantian view of mathematics in
Boutroux, which helped prepare the way for Poincaré’s conventionalism in
geometry.
Turning to the case studies of scientists, Gregor Schiemann considers
Werner Heisenberg’s position on a hypothetical conception of science, finding
a pluralism akin to that of William James. According to Heisenberg, some
established theories in physics are “closed”; that is, they are no longer open
to minor revision but at the same time have limited applicability. So while
they contribute to the stability of science, such theories are not incompatible
with understanding parts of scientific knowledge as hypothetical. Andreas
Hüttemann looks at pluralism and the hypothetical in Heinrich Hertz’s phi-
losophy of science, arguing that the common view of Hertz as an antirealist
and pluralist is overblown. Furthermore, while Hertz makes consistent appeal
to the concept of hypothesis, he does not rule out the possibility of the discov-
ery of correct scientific theories, so he cannot be said to have contributed to the
continuing development of a hypothetical view of science, at least in a strong
sense of the term. The collection is completed by a piece by Michael Esfeld on
the hypothetical metaphysics of nature. He considers what metaphysics will
look like if it is based on science and is therefore hypothetical and fallible.
The result is a consideration of a tenseless theory of time and existence in which
there is no objective “now,” just as there is no absolute sense in which two events
can be simultaneous in the special theory of relativity. Esfeld concludes with
comments on the mutual dependence of science and philosophy, which is a
very fitting conclusion to the volume and, of course, very fitting for a book
being discussed in HOPOS.
The volume raises very interesting issues that should be the topic of further
inquiry. For example, the role of pragmatism is raised many times here, and it
would be beneficial to focus some studies on the relation of the pragmatists to
the idea of hypotheticity. The role played by the formalization of mathematics
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and logic is another area to investigate further, given the connections men-
tioned in several of the essays. There are also undoubtedly more philosophers
and scientists who played a role in the development of the hypothetical
conception of science, and these should be considered in future work. I
strongly recommend the book, given that the quality of the chapters is uni-
formly high and that it offers much to learn about the history of the phi-
losophy of science.
David J. Stump, University of San Francisco
Timothy McGrew, Marc Alspector-Kelly, and Fritz Allhoff, eds. Philosophy of Science:
An Historical Anthology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Pp. xx+680. $104.95
(cloth); $57.95 (paper).
The editors of this collection write that “existing anthologies in the philoso-
phy of science almost invariably present science as seen through the lens of
twentieth-century developments” (1). The collection they present as an alter-
native is a creditable effort, and it will enrich many classrooms, yet the extent to
which it succeeds in providing another lens or lenses is a matter that deserves
careful thought. The first thing to say about an anthology, however, is what it
includes and what it does not.
The present volume provides, through its selections and its substantial intro-
ductions, (1) a standard history of astronomy and dynamics through Newton;
(2) a selection of methodological and epistemological texts from the atomists
through the early twentieth century; (3) an introduction to the “received view” in
philosophy of science; and (4) an introduction to subsequent Anglo-American
debates concerning confirmation and observation, methodology, explanation,
and realism. More specifically, part 1 includes units on (1) the ancient and me-
dieval periods, with particular attention to atomism, Aristotle, and later chal-
lenges to Aristotle’s dynamics (82 large pages); (2) the scientific revolution,
especially Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton (188 pages); (3) modern
philosophers from Bacon to Kant (55 pages); and (4) methodology in the writ-
ings of scientists and a handful of philosophers from Lavoisier to Einstein
(69 pages). Part 2 includes units on (5) the received view (Carnap, Hempel,
Reichenbach, and Strawson; 72 pages), (6) confirmation and observation
(Hempel, Quine, Goodman, Putnam, Hanson, and Maxwell; 80 pages),
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